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[Y]ou must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 
—Federalist No. 511 
INTRODUCTION* 
A. The Speluncean Explorers, “Duke Lacrosse Case,” and the Dilemma of Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
In Lon Fuller’s classic exposition on jurisprudence, The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers,2 a hypothetical court grapples with the conviction of a party of cavers who 
killed one of their number for food while trapped underground.3  As perhaps an aside to 
                                                 
1 FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Hamilton or Madison). 
* I would like to thank Dean Kevin Saunders and Professor Barbara O’Brien for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this Essay, as well as Professor Glen Staszewski for 
discussing some of the most important underpinnings of this Essay with me.  Special 
thanks to Professor Saunders for first exposing me to Lon Fuller’s Case of the 
Speluncean Explorers, which sparked this Essay.  All errors are my own. 
2 Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARVARD L. REV. 616 (1949). 
3 The statute in Fuller’s scenario provided, “Whoever shall willfully take the life of 
another shall be punished by death.”  Id. at 619. 
 the main debate,4 two of the court’s formalist judges wished aloud that executives—the 
president or prosecuting attorney—would give them an “out.”  Justice Tatting bemoaned 
that “the Prosecutor saw fit to ask for an indictment for murder. . . . [and i]f no other 
charge suited to the facts of this case could be brought against the defendants, it would 
have been wiser . . . not to have indicted them at all.”5  The more committed formalist on 
the court, Judge Keen, punted to the executive, saying clemency “is a question for the 
Chief Executive, not for [the court.]”6  The court’s realist, Justice Handy, handily 
responded: “Strict as he [Tatting] is himself in complying with the demands of legal 
theory, he is quite content to have the fate of these men decided out of court by the 
Prosecutor on the basis of common sense.”7 
While Justice Handy’s retort was intended to support greater judicial discretion, in 
this Essay I use it as a springboard for a different inquiry entirely.  Rather than embracing 
broad and insulated discretion as intrinsically good, I adopt some formalist critiques of 
discretion.  But this Essay criticizes formalist scholarship—using an internalist 
approach8—for failing to answer Handy’s challenge: if judicial discretion can be 
                                                 
4 The role of the judiciary in our system of government. 
5 Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, supra note 2 at 631.  The more 
committed formalist on the court, Judge Keen, punts to the executive, saying clemency 
“is a question for the Chief Executive, not for [the court.]”  Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 641. 
8 I borrow this term from Professor Ali Khan, he uses it to describe the differing 
effectiveness of critiques of Islamic law.  “Internalist” critiques that presume Islam is a 
valid religion naturally are going to be accepted within the community of Islamic jurists 
and legal scholars.  On the other hand, “externalist” critiques, which presume that Islam 
is untrue, are much more likely to be rejected out of hand.  See Liaquat Ali Khan, 
Symposium, The Future of Islamic Law Jurisprudence, Free Markets of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. __ (2006) (forthcoming).  As this Essay will 
 dangerous, why not also prosecutorial discretion?  This challenge is timely, given the 
ongoing debates regarding judicial discretion on the Supreme Court, and public scrutiny 
of one particular prosecutor’s exercise of discretion.  The controversy surrounding North 
Carolina district attorney, Mike Nifong’s, charging of several students at Duke University 
with rape—the so-called “Duke lacrosse case”—raises issues regarding prosecutorial 
discretion that are normally taken for granted.  While the circumstances of the case are 
exceptional,9 the exercise of prosecutorial discretion may have grave consequences under 
even the most mundane circumstances.10 
The Essay seeks to establish that contemporary formalist critiques concerning 
judicial discretion often apply equally to prosecutorial discretion, particularly 
prosecutors’ charging and plea-bargaining choices.  To curb these dangers, I argue that 
prosecutors should submit to similar restraints on their discretion, ranging from self-
imposed guidelines (mirroring the self-restraint of judicial interpretive methodologies) to 
institutional and statutory reforms.   
B. Roadmap 
Proving this thesis entails five primary steps.  Part I quickly describes formalism 
in contemporary practice—primarily the textualist approach to statutory interpretation.  
This is necessary to establish what practice—and what thinkers—I am primarily 
                                                                                                                                                 
demonstrate, I adopt an internalist approach not only for persuasive purposes, but also 
because there is great value to formalist critiques of discretion. 
9 Including the socioeconomic disparities between the alleged victim and defendants, 
town-gown relations, and intense media scrutiny. 
10 “North Carolina State Bar Files Ethics Complaint Against Duke Lacrosse Rape 
Prosecutor,” FOXNews.com, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,239664,00.html (last 
visited 3/30/07). 
 criticizing.  It would be difficult to demonstrate the incongruity between the 
contemporary formalists’ approach to statutory interpretation and enforcement discretion 
without this brief outline. 
Part II discusses the remarkably wide discretion enjoyed by criminal prosecutors.  
While other categories of prosecutorial discretion exist, I discuss three “classic” 
examples: (1) charging and charge bargaining; (2) plea bargaining; and (3) plea 
bargaining coupled with agreements to cooperate.  I chose these examples because a 
well-developed literature covers them in depth, and because they profoundly affect trial 
strategy, prosecutorial ethics, and the procedural protections practically available to 
defendants.  Prosecutors enjoy wide discretion in each category, and I will show, 
textualists tend to endorse this (or at least its cognates in administrative enforcement). 
Part III demonstrates that formalists’ acquiescence to prosecutorial discretion 
fundamentally contradicts the political and jurisprudential values animating formalism 
and its current manifestation, textualism.  I outline these values in some detail, and then 
stack them up against the categories of discretion that I described in Part II.  Prosecutorial 
discretion violates all of the values animating textualism. 
Even after seeing that the critiques and policy concerns of formalists apply 
equally to prosecutors as they do to judges, some may reply that prosecutors are different 
because they are politically accountable to the people.  Part IV addresses this counter-
argument.  Finally, I offer some formalist solutions to better restrain prosecutorial 
discretion in Part V. 
 C. Two Preliminary Notes 
1. We Should Take Formalism Seriously 
One may legitimately ask at this point: “I think formalism is fundamentally 
flawed—so what can I get out of this?  After all, aren’t we ‘all legal realists now?’”11  I 
offer three reasons why we should study contemporary legal formalism.   
First, perhaps surprisingly, latter-day formalism draws biting insights from realist 
understandings of the legislative process and judicial operation.  In other words, the 
formalist critique is grounded in practical observation of how contemporary political 
institutions work—and a practical normative vision of how they should work.  If one 
values a reliable, predictable legal system, they ignore textualism’s critique of intent-
based statutory interpretation at their own peril. 
Second, irrespective of one’s agreement with it, formalism is both a conceptual 
lens and a pragmatic tool to achieve better results.  As a lens, it helps us evaluate 
prosecutorial discretion in a new way—and see whether we are comfortable with how it 
is regulated.  As a tool, it may help us protect those values—and to elicit better results 
from the government irrespective of one’s agreement with formalism.  I thus agree with 
Professor Cass Sunstein that the real question is “what degree of formalism?” rather than 
“formalist or not?”12   
Third, even if one vehemently disagrees with it, formalism often sets the terms of 
the debate in statutory and constitutional interpretation.  As an important player in the 
                                                 
11 See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) 
(book review of LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986).). 
12 Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 
640 (1999). 
 current debate, formalism merits intense scrutiny.  If, for example, textualists’ positions 
on executive discretion prove inconsistent with their approach to judicial discretion, this 
may suggest basic conceptual weaknesses to their approach. 
2.  This Essay is Written with the Deepest of Respect for Prosecutors’ 
Professionalism and Integrity 
I hold prosecutors and their calling in our system of justice in the highest esteem.  
Prosecutors, in my experience, are dutiful public servants who do their best to achieve 
justice in their communities.  They often forego more lucrative careers in favor of public 
service, courageously face considerable dilemmas daily as they satisfy their complex 
ethical and public duties. 
Rather than impugn prosecutors’ integrity, this Essay recognizes that prosecutors 
face enormous workloads and other institutional pressures.  While prosecutors, like most 
people in public service, try to do right in each individual case, they may—without the 
proper incentives—cause undesired results at the system level.   
This actually is why formalism offers a particularly attractive framework for 
evaluating and reforming the prosecutorial system.  After all, formalist critiques of 
discretion-conferring doctrines of statutory interpretation do not presume that judges are 
bad people, either.  Exactly the opposite: in their efforts to achieve justice in individual 
cases, the argument goes, judges cause systemic problems.  To the extent, then, 
formalistic restraints have helped encourage better judging, they may also foster better 
prosecution. 
 I. A THUMBNAIL OF LEGAL FORMALISM AND TEXTUALISM, ITS MOST PROMINENT 
MANIFESTATION 
A. Formalism 
While the thinkers I discuss in this Essay would most readily identify themselves 
as textualists, they belong to a larger school of legal thought known as formalism.  
Although formalism has often been defined negatively—more as foil of legal realists and 
critical legal theorists than a form of positive self-identification13—its tenets are widely 
agreed-upon.  Black’s Law Dictionary economically describes legal formalism as “[t]he 
theory that law is a set of rules and principles independent of other political and social 
institutions.”14  Professor Lawrence Slocum describes it more elaborately as the belief 
that: 
1. The law consists of rules.  
2. Legal rules can be meaningful.  
3. Legal rules can be applied to particular facts.  
4. Some actions accord with meaningful legal rules; other actions do not.  
5. The standard for what constitutes following a rule vel non can be 
publicly knowable and the focus of intersubjective agreement.15 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1995) (retroactively applying 
the term to Christopher Columbus Langdell). 
14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), legal formalism. 
15 Lawrence Solum’s Legal Theory Lexicon, Formalism and Instrumentalism, 
http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-lexicon-043-formalism-
and.html (last visited 3/27/07); see also Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended 
Empirically?, supra note 12 at 638 (“[Formalism] entail[s] three commitments: to 
promoting compliance with all applicable legal formalities (whether or not they make 
sense in the individual case), to ensuring rule-bound law (even if application of the rule, 
statutory or contractual, makes little sense in the individual case), and to constraining the 
discretion of judges in deciding cases.”). 
 Beyond being a belief system regarding the nature and potential of rules, legal formalism 
typically carries with it certain political values with it, which I outline in Part II. 
B. The Textualist Methodology 
Legal formalism is today most prominent in the discussion of constitutional and 
statutory interpretation, using the approaches of originalism and textualism.16  In contrast 
to the Supreme Court majority’s eclectic, and oft-times intentionalist, approach to 
statutory interpretation,17 textualists believe courts should analyze statutes based on their 
“plain meaning.”  While textualists decry the use of legislative history more than earlier 
formalists,18 their primary emphasis is positive.  Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court’s most 
outspoken textualist, believes the court can discern a statute’s objective meaning using a 
discrete set of linguistic and logical tools: 
[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; 
and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is 
any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary 
one applies. If not -- and especially if a good reason for the ordinary 
meaning appears plain -- we apply that ordinary meaning.19 
Statutory meaning, then, exists independently of the subjective consciousness of the 
legislature or a particular person reading the law.  Judge Frank Easterbrook, perhaps 
                                                 
16 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 
(1990) (describing the tenets of the “new textualism,” embodied in the jurisprudence of 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, as well as Judge Easterbrook). 
17 Professor Eskridge has characterized this as a “soft plain meaning rule.”  Id.  
18 Justices Burger and Rehnquist may be better understood as formalists than textualists, 
as they regularly reviewed legislative history, even if they did not weigh them heavily.  
See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Burger, J.) (reasoning 
that statutes, not appropriations, legitimately signify legislative intent); Griffin v Oceanic 
Contractors, 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.) (imposing trebled back pay between 
discharge and satisfaction of trial court’s judgment to injured seaman because plain 
language of statute so required—despite his quick reemployment). 
19 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 textualism’s second-most-prolific advocate, says statutes “should be read, like a 
contractual offer, to find their reasonable import.”20  Justice Scalia has alluded to the 
common law negligence “reasonable person standard”21 as well as well as the 
“objectified intent” one might use interpreting a contract.22  Textualists find the objective 
meaning from common legal understandings of terms,23 the structure of the interpreted 
statute,24 and the use of words and phrases in other statutes (the “whole code” 
approach).25   
Textualists’ strict interpretive methodology is as much inspired by hermeneutics 
as by particular views about the proper relationship between the branches of government.  
As I will demonstrate at length in Part III, the first three values animating textualism are, 
unsurprisingly, tied the “rule of law” and formalism: 
(1) Neutral principles, or impartiality and equality before the law; 
(2) Consistent, principled decision-making; and, 
(3) Predictable and reliable methods and decisions. 
                                                 
20 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (1988). 
21 United States v. O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. 79, 98 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using “a 
reasonably diligent lawyer” standard to measure validity of an interpretation). 
22 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (1997) (“We look for a sort of 
‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the 
law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”) 
23 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 
717-718 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (drawing from specialized legal usage to 
understand Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on the “taking” of endangered species). 
24 See., e.g., United Savs. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 
365, 371 (1988) (Scalia, J.). 
25 See, e.g., W. Virg. Univ Hosp v Casey [1991](Scalia, J.) (when Congress wanted fees 
for experts of prevailing Ps, it did so; therefore no expert fees under § 1988). 
 These values echo the traditional formalist concerns that I outlined in Part I.A.  
Additionally, textualists subscribe to corollary or necessary substantive political values.  
Without them, textualists would argue, there cannot be rule of law: 
(1) empowerment and accountability for the legislature; 
(2) limiting the risks of legislation by the judiciary; and, 
(3) institutional independence to enforce unpopular rules. 
Each of these principles disfavors current deference to prosecutorial discretion. 
II. FORMALISTS EMBRACE THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S RELATIVE NON-REGULATION OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
Keeping in mind the values that I discussed above, consider current regulation of 
prosecutorial discretion.  In Subpart A, I briefly outline four areas where prosecutors 
enjoy nearly unfettered power.  In Subpart B, I demonstrate that, to the extent formalists 
even recognize these powers as controversial, they are disposed to endorse them. 
A. Prosecutorial Discretion is Lightly-Regulated 
“The legal profession has left much of a prosecutor’s day-to-day decision-making 
unregulated, in favor of [a] catch-all ‘seek justice’ admonition.”26  True, the rules of 
evidence, criminal procedure, and professional conduct, regulate criminal prosecutors’ 
conduct.27  But these rules allow prosecutors to decide which cases to prosecute, choose 
                                                 
26 R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About 
a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 637 (2006). 
27 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.8; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 
1993). 
 charges, recommend bail, negotiate pleas, and enter agreements to cooperate.28  Each of 
these powers may prove path-determinative for a criminal defendant. 
1. Charging and Charge-Bargaining 
Criminal codes typically offer prosecutors a wide menu of options for charging 
under a set of facts.  Professors Wright and Ergen note, for example, that “in North 
Carolina, a stabbing might support charges ranging from assault ‘with a deadly weapon 
with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury,’ all the way down to misdemeanor ‘simple 
assault.’”29  Using the North Carolina example, if a police officer refers a stabbing 
incident, a prosecutor must decide what initial charge to file a minimal charge, such as 
simple assault, all the way up to assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.  
Considering that the prosecutor’s initial charges sets her posture for plea negotiation—
which resolves almost all criminal cases nationwide30—her charging decision may often 
determine the outcome of the criminal proceeding. 
a. Institutional Limitations on Charging 
Depending on the prosecutor’s office, a prosecutor may be subject to extensive or 
weak limitations on how they charge crimes.  The United States Attorney’s office, for 
example, imposes many limitations on Assistant United States Attorneys’ charging 
                                                 
28 Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a 
Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 
1935 (2006). 
29 Id. at 1940 (references omitted). 
30 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Case Processing Statistics, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006) (relating that 95 
percent of felony convictions are achieved through plea bargains); see also GEORGE 
FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 233 (2003) (relating that 90 percent of cases were 
resolved through plea bargains).  See also infra Part II.A.2. 
 discretion.  Most importantly, they are bound by the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (“Principles 
of Federal Prosecution”)31 and a series of memos from the Attorney General on charging 
and plea agreements.  The most important of these, the 2003 “Ashcroft memo,”32  
requires that, “in all federal criminal cases, federal prosecutors must charge and pursue 
the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of 
the case.”33  Under the memo, “charges should not be filed simply to exert leverage to 
induce a plea,”34 a directive enforced by strict limitations on when prosecutors can 
withdraw charges.35  Furthermore, DOJ’s bureaucracy ensures both individual review of 
prosecutors’ charging decisions, as well as a system-wide review of charging 
consistency.36  Federal administrative agencies like the EPA have similar, if less detailed, 
self-imposed guidelines for criminal investigation and prosecution.37 
                                                 
31 Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html. 
32 Memo from Attorney General John Ashcroft to All Federal Prosecutors, Memo 
Regarding Policy On Charging Of Criminal Defendants (September 22, 2003), , 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (hereinafter “Aschcroft 
memo”). 
33 Id. at § I.A; see also U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-27.300 (“[O]nce the decision to 
prosecute has been made, the attorney for the government should charge, or should 
recommend that the grand jury charge, the most serious offense that is consistent with the 
nature of the defendant's conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction. . 
. .”). 
34 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 32 at § I.A. 
35 Id. (“Once filed, the most serious readily provable charges may not be dismissed 
except to the extent permitted in [one of] Section B[‘s limited exceptions.”); see also id at 
§ I.B (providing exceptions for when sentences wouldn't be affected, where the 
prosecutor has determined that the most serious offense is not readily provable, etc.). 
36 Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial 
Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1063, 1081-84 (2006). 
37 See, e.g., Memorandum from Office of Criminal Enforcement Director Earl Devaney 
to All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal Enforcement Program 
 It is unclear, by contrast, what guidelines thousands of local prosecutors impose 
upon themselves.  Moreover, Professor Michael Cassidy points out that, while a 
statement of factors in a charging policy manual serve as 
useful guidepost[s], obviously it would be both ineffectual and 
unenforceable as an ethical norm, because highly subjective 
determinations such as relative value and relative culpability are each 
components of the overall equation.  These are the sort of difficult 
decisions that even the most seasoned prosecutors lose sleep over, 
particularly in cases involving violent crimes such as murder or rape.38 
b. Reasons for Charging Decisions 
The most straightforward reason behind a charging decision is likely the 
prosecutor’s evaluation of the facts.  Going back to the example of the knifing in North 
Carolina, the most obvious difference between the simple assault and assault with intent 
to kill is scienter.  A prosecutor, with the help of law enforcement, would gather and 
evaluate facts shedding light on the defendant’s state of mind: is there evidence of 
premeditation, did the defendant act in self-defense, was the knifing the result of an 
impulsive bar fight?  Doubtless many if not most charging decisions arise from these 
kinds of legitimate fact-based considerations. 
In the background, though, many other pressures and motivations could influence 
a charging decision.  The most unavoidable of these considerations is the prosecutorial 
and judicial workload.  Defense counsel for poor clients, prosecutors, and trial courts all 
benefit from resolving cases quickly.  Numerous studies of public defenders’ offices, 
prosecutors’ offices, and criminal courts, indicate that plea- and charge-bargaining is not 
                                                                                                                                                 
Regarding the Exercise of Investigative Discretion (Jan. 12, 1994), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/criminal/exercise.pdf. 
38 Cassidy, Character and Context, supra note 26 at 660. 
 done necessarily in the interests of individual clients, but rather to deal with the 
overwhelming caseload.39  At least one court has gone so far as to say that guilty pleas 
“literally stave[] off collapse of the law enforcement system.”40  And charging decision 
(especially where the facts could support charging a crime with a mandatory minimum 
sentence) may determine whether a defendant pleas or mounts a vigorous, lengthy, and 
expensive defense.  
Empirical scholarship notes less obvious incentives for both over- and under-
charging defendants, too.  In federal sentencing research, for example, scholars found that 
in a substantial minority of cases—25 to 35 percent—prosecutors use charge-reduction to 
avoid mandatory minimum sentencing.41  This is particularly common with drug and 
weapon possession cases.42  When the Minnesota legislature introduced a mandatory 
sentencing scheme, prosecutors became more likely to engage in charge-bargaining for 
more serious offenses, particularly child sexual offenses.43  On the other end, prosecutors 
                                                 
39 Richard Klein, Symposium: The Promise of Gideon: Unfulfilled?, Judicial Misconduct 
in Criminal Cases: It’s Not Just the Counsel Who May Be Ineffective and Unprofessional, 
4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 196-98 (2006). 
40 People v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788 (N.Y. 1974). 
41 Wright & Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance, supra note 28 at 1945-46. 
42 Id. 
43 Professor Frase notes that prosecutors seem to be making policy choices by 
consistently charging some offenses below the mandatory-minimum level, but not others: 
As would be expected in a conviction-offense system that regulates 
sentences but not prosecutorial discretion, the proportion of cases 
involving charge bargaining increased, while the overall rate of sentence 
bargaining decreased.  Increases in charge reduction (“vertical” charging) 
were especially great for [serious offenses like felony DWI, robbery, first 
degree criminal sexual conduct, and second- and third-degree murder] . . ., 
with criminal histories of zero or one point.  The changes were greatest for 
child sex abuse cases (most of which were committed by white offenders); 
 can use “multiple charging” to increase their bargaining power over defendants under 
certain circumstances, since the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow for sentencing 
enhancement based on the same conduct to enhance multiple charges.44 
And prosecutors may face other practical pressures on their charging decisions. 
They may, for example, be motivated to seek “a high conviction rate, a good relationship 
with influential private attorneys, and an absence of high-profile trial losses,” though 
these factors do not necessarily promote the public’s interest in effective crime control.45  
Indeed, as has been recently alleged against the current presidential administration, 
external political pressure might prompt a prosecutor to pursue a particular charge.46 
2. Plea Bargaining 
Aside from modest judicial scrutiny of plea entry, plea bargaining is “almost 
completely unregulated.”47  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
only that the court evaluate such a plea “in consideration of the views of the parties and 
                                                                                                                                                 
charge reduction rates increased from 50 percent of the cases in 1978 to 80 
percent in 1981. 
Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME & JUST. 
131, 177-78 (2005).  While Professor Frase highlights the troubling racial aspect of these 
decisions, I would underscore a political-structural problem: executives are essentially 
selectively nullifying legislative deals.  But when a legislative deal comports with 
litigation strategy, policy preferences, or whatnot, they do aggressively enforce it. 
44 See Jacqueline E. Ross, Damned Under Many Headings: The Problem of Multiple 
Punishment, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245, 268-71 (2002). 
45 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Symposium: Punishment, Plea Bargaining as a Disaster, 101 
YALE LAW J. 1979, 1987 (1992). 
46 See, e.g., William Yardley, Gonzales Bowed to Politics, a Former U.S. Attorney Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at A16 (relating Congressional testimony from fired federal 
prosecutors who believed that they were dismissed for handling politically-sensitive cases 
in a manner the White House disapproved). 
47 Cassidy, Character and Context, supra note 26 at 654. 
 the interest of the public in the effective administration of justice.”48  Yet 95 percent of 
felony convictions nationally result from guilty pleas,49 and judges reject guilty pleas in 
only two percent of cases.50  This is largely because, unless they take initiative, trial 
judges “have no independent access to information by which to assess the strength of the 
case against defendants who offer to plead guilty.”51 
Why do prosecutors plea bargain?  As discussed above, prosecutors may value 
getting more convictions over getting serious convictions.52  Acquittals, after all, might 
aversely affect one’s career.53  Prosecutors’ averseness to overly harsh penalties may 
matter, too.  In North Carolina, Professors Wright and Engen found that the availability 
of lower charges increased the odds that prosecutors would enter plea deals.54  This may 
                                                 
48 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 11. 
49 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Case Processing Statistics, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006); see also GEORGE 
FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 233 (2003) (relating that 90 percent of cases were 
resolved through plea bargains). 
50 Klein, Judicial Misconduct in Criminal Cases, supra note 39 at 212-13 (citing William 
F. McDonald, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES 135 
(1985).).  This is especially troubling, given that “it is common for defense counsel in our 
large urban courts to offer a guilty plea on behalf of their client within minutes of having 
first met the defendant.”  Id. at 203. 
51 Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal 
Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 717 (2006); see also Wright & Engen, Effects of Depth 
and Distance,  supra note 28 at 1937 (“In addition to remaining beyond the reach of 
conventional sources of law, these discretionary choices are easier to hide than a judge’s 
discretion in sentencing and remain largely outside the spotlight of academic inquiry.”). 
52 See Wright & Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance, supra note 28. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1958.  They note: 
[T]he frequency of charge reductions is much higher among more serious 
crimes than among less serious crimes. Rates of charge reduction are very 
high (ranging from 60% to 82% of all cases) among offense classes B1 to 
D, for which a prison sentence is essentially mandatory. Charge reductions 
 stem from prosecutors’ senses of moral responsibility—such as whether they consider it 
intrinsically wrong to let off a defendant who committed a reprehensible crime.55  Or it 
could reflect their judgments regarding public policy—whether conviction at a particular 
level sufficiently protects the public.56  More pragmatically, a plea decision could 
“respond to a defense attorney’s tactical pressures, to penalize a defendant because he has 
taken an inordinate share of the court’s and the prosecutor’s time, to do favor for 
particular defense attorneys in the hope of future cooperation, or to attempt to please 
victims and policemen for political reasons.”57 
3. Agreements to Cooperate 
Professor Cassidy explains that decisions to offer plea deals in exchange for 
investigative or trial assistance implicate the same concerns as normal plea deals, plus the 
prosecutor’s duty to find the truth: 
Every decision whether to “flip” an indicted co-conspirator requires a 
contextual assessment of the strengths and weakness of the case, the 
relative culpability of the codefendants, the credibility of the accomplice 
and whether his testimony can be corroborated, the prior criminal records 
                                                                                                                                                 
are also common (65%) at class E, where a sizeable minority of offenders 
also fall into the Active portion of the sentencing grid. Below that, charge 
reductions are still very common, but much less so than for the cases 
falling in the upper portion of the offense distribution. This appears to 
correspond with the findings from Minnesota, described above, that 
charge reductions were more common among cases that would have a 
presumptive prison sentence if convicted as originally charged. 
Id. 
55 Cassidy, Character and Context, supra note 26 at 654-56. 
56 Id. 
57 Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 UNIV. CHICAGO. L. 
REV. 50, 79 (1968). 
 of both the accomplice and the other codefendants, and a balancing of law 
enforcement priorities and resources.58 
Yet, like other plea agreements, agreements to cooperate are rarely subjected to 
meaningful scrutiny.  Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), “leave of court” 
is required before a United States Attorney may dismiss an indictment.  But in practice 
courts are generally unwilling to interfere with bargains to cooperate.59  And even though 
prosecutors are sometimes criticized by media commentators for entering agreements to 
cooperate, “the public does not seem to react to such news accounts with alarm or 
dismay, at least at the voting booth.”60 
                                                 
58 Id. at 659. 
59 See The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 603 (1878); United States v. Gonzalez, 58 F.3d 
459, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, 
Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 
125-28 (1994) (demonstrating that it is rare for a judge to second-guess the prosecutor’s 
request for leniency). 
60 Professor Cassidy explains the reasons why prosecutors may not be punished 
politically for entering agreements to cooperate: 
Democratic processes similarly provide very little check on a prosecutor’s 
decision to “flip” an accomplice.  Most prosecutors on the state and local 
level are elected officials.  While the news media may sometimes question 
the wisdom and fairness of deals made with accomplice witnesses, the 
public does not seem to react to such news accounts with alarm or dismay, 
at least at the voting booth. It is exceptionally rare in this country for an 
incumbent prosecutor to be voted out of office.  The electorate may 
assume that cooperation agreements are inappropriate subjects for lay 
scrutiny, because the prosecutor has access to behind-the-scenes 
information not available to the average citizen.  Or, high-profile 
convictions that follow accomplice bargaining may foster public 
perception of prosecutorial competence and zeal. 
Cassidy, Character and Context, supra note 26 at 657 (internal footnote references and 
citations omitted). 
 B. Formalists Tend to Afford Executives Wide Discretion 
As a general matter, textualists (like pretty much everyone else) seem disposed to 
grant executives wide discretion in enforcing the law.  Renowned formalist Frank 
Easterbrook, for example, has argued that prosecutors’ ability to plea-bargaining is part 
of a well-functioning “market system” that sets the price of criminal conduct.61  This 
comports with Judge Easterbrook’s general friendliness to the delegation of policymaking 
powers to executive agencies.62 
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, has not spoken directly to the issue of criminal 
prosecutorial discretion.  He has, however, joined the Court in sustaining broad 
delegations of power to administrative agencies.63  He subscribes to the Chevron 
                                                 
61 See Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 289 (1983). 
62 See, e.g., NBD Bank, N.A. v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, 
J.) (“No Member of Congress can anticipate all questions that will come to light; and a 
body containing hundreds of members with divergent agendas can’t answer even a small 
portion of the questions that do occur to its members. That is one reason why Congress 
frequently delegates power to executive officials . . . .”);  Estate of Kurz v. 
Commissioner, 68 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Regulation-writers 
have substantial leeway in their interpretation . . . because the delegation of the power to 
make substantive regulations is the delegation of a law-creation power, and interpretation 
is a vital part of the law-creation process.”) (internal citation omitted). 
63 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 126 S.Ct. 904, 926-29 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (deferring to agency’s interpretation of controlled substance statute); Touby v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (joining in Justice O’Connor’s opinion that 
Congress’s allowing DOJ temporarily schedule controlled substance “to avoid an 
imminent hazard to the public safety” under criminal statute did not violate nondelegation 
doctrine); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989) (joining in Justice 
O’Connnor’s opinion that statute that directed Secretary of Transportation to establish 
system of user fees to cover costs of administering federal pipeline safety programs was 
not an unconstitutional delegation of taxing power by Congress to executive branch). 
 doctrine64 and a toothless nondelegation doctrine.65  Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook 
are not alone among formalists in deferring to agencies.66 
                                                 
64 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(Stevens, J.).  Professor Gregory Maggs aptly describes the famed "Chevron two-step:" 
Chevron's first step requires a court interpreting a statute to determine 
whether Congress has “directly spoken” to the question at issue by 
expressing its intent unambiguously.  If Congress has spoken directly to 
the question, the court must interpret the statute according to what 
Congress has directed. The court does not need to defer to a construction 
that an administrative agency has put on the statute. 
If Congress has not spoken directly to the question at issue, then the court 
must move to Chevron's second step. In the second step, the court must 
decide whether an agency which administers the statute has adopted a 
“permissible”-- which generally means a reasonable--interpretation of the 
statute. If the agency has adopted a permissible interpretation, then the 
court must defer to that interpretation. 
Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of 
Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 399 (1996).  Justice Scalia was not on the Court 
when it decided Chevron, but is doubtless an adherent.  See, e.g., Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“a certain degree of discretion, 
and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive and judicial action, and it is up to 
Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to 
determine--up to a point--how small or how large that degree shall be.”).  Under 
Chevron, according to Justice Scalia,  
there is no longer any justification for giving “special” deference to “long-
standing and consistent” agency interpretations of law. That venerable 
principle made a lot of sense when we assumed that both court and agency 
were searching for the one, permanent, “correct” meaning of the statute; it 
makes no sense when we acknowledge that the agency is free to give the 
statute whichever of several possible meanings it thinks most conducive to 
accomplishment of the statutory purpose.  Under the latter regime, there is 
no apparent justification for holding the agency to its first answer, or 
penalizing it for a change of mind. 
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 511, 518 (1989). 
65 See Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472-77 (2001) 
(Scalia, J.). 
 In fairness to textualists, they are perhaps less likely to find statutes ambiguous under the 
Chevron doctrine, and therefore may defer to executive agencies less than their eclectic 
colleagues.67  Professor Gregory Maggs, for example, systematically analyzed Justice 
Scalia’s first 52 Chevron-related opinions on the Court, and found that he deferred to 
administrative agencies about as often as everyone else.68  In any case, Justice Scalia and 
other textualist commentators seem about as disposed as non-textualists to defer to 
executive agencies. 
III. WIDE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION VIOLATES THE VALUES UNDERLYING 
FORMALISM AND TEXTUALISM 
Having established that formalists generally seem unconcerned with broad 
executive discretion, I now evaluate this stance against the values animating their 
critiques of discretion-conferring rules of statutory interpretation: 
(1) neutral principles, or impartiality and equality before the law; 
(2) consistent, principled decision-making;  
                                                                                                                                                 
66 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Buckley, J.) 
(“[T]he Commission’s licensing decisions are generally entitled to the highest judicial 
deference because of the unusually broad authority that Congress delegated to the agency 
under the Atomic Energy Act.” (internal citation omitted)); Richard M. Wagner, 
Gonzalez v. Oregon: The Assisted Suicide of Chevron Deference, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
___ (2007) (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author) (“A major social gain from the 
Chevron doctrine is, perhaps paradoxically, an increase in the democratic accountability 
of policymaking. . . . [since r]ulemaking bureaucrats are not chosen by the people, true, 
but in many cases they are chosen by the person who was chosen by the people—the 
President.”); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON 
REG. 283, 307-10 (1986) (preferring Chevron deference because it circumscribes the role 
of the judiciary, which is the only unelected branch). 
67 Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: 
Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive 
Agencies, 86 Ky. L.J. 527, 586-90 (1997-1998). 
68 Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine, supra note 64 at 409-17. 
 (3) predictable and reliable methods and decisions; 
(4) empowerment and accountability for the legislature; 
(5) limiting the risks of legislation by the judiciary; and, 
(6) institutional independence to enforce unpopular rules. 
In many cases, prosecutorial discretion risks the same kinds of dangers as judicial 
discretion.  This necessitates, as I explain in Part IV, serious introspection by formalists, 
and formalist reforms of the prosecutorial profession. 
A. Autonomy and Impersonality of the Law 
1. The Formalist Rationale for Autonomy and Impersonality of the Law 
Uniformity is a good in itself, say formalists.  This is because they agree with 
Paine’s claim that, in America, the law is king.69  This grounded in constitutional, 
prudential, and practical principles.   
In a republic, the legislature enacts the law, the executive enforces it, and the 
judiciary applies it.  Under this understanding, a rule is undemocratic if it does not 
undergo the rigorous constitutionally-mandated legislative process.  The separation of 
powers, coupled with the safeguards of the legislative process ensures that citizens are 
never governed by the whims of one person or faction.  Justice Scalia, for example, warns 
that “Statutes that are seen as establishing rules of inadequate clarity or precision are 
                                                 
69 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776) (“[I]n America THE LAW IS KING. For as in 
absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law OUGHT to be King; 
and there ought to be no other.”). 
 criticized . . . as undemocratic--and, in the extreme, unconstitutional--because they leave 
too much to be decided by persons other than the people’s representatives.”70 
At the prudential level, the formalist worldview posits that the administration of 
justice is most effective and fair when conduct is regulated impersonal ex ante rules.  
This is not to say that formalists do not recognize that rules can be explicitly stated to 
apply to any possible situation that they are supposed to govern.  Indeed, Justice Scalia 
acknowledges that “[e]xecutives and judges handle individual cases; the legislature 
generalizes.”71 
Finally, at a practical level, impartial law is more likely to be perceived as fair and 
legitimate.  If the law announces abstract principles in advance, the argument goes, a 
party suffering an adverse ruling is less likely to feel they lost because the judge “didn’t 
like them” or the politics of their position.72  Textualists claim that interpretive methods 
                                                 
70 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 
(1989). 
71 Id. at 1176. 
72 Justice Scalia explains: 
Besides its centrality to the rule of law in general, consistency has a 
special role to play in judge-made law. . . . The only checks on the 
arbitrariness of federal judges are the insistence upon consistency and the 
application of the teachings of the mother of consistency, logic. . . . [C] 
ourts apply to each case a system of abstract and entirely fictional 
categories developed in earlier cases, which are designed, if logically 
applied, to produce “fair” or textually faithful results. 
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 581, 588-89 (1989-90). 
 that leave too many options to judges cannot appear impartial, even if the court in fact 
was fair.73 
2. Broad Prosecutorial Discretion May Inject Personal Preferences into the 
Administration of the Law 
Formalists believe that the law should be abstract and impersonal—something 
achieved by the imposition of discretion-constraining rules on judges’ interpretive 
powers.  Executives’ powers of application arguably implicate the same concerns, and 
should be subjected to similar constraints. 
If prosecutors choose to not enforce a law because they disagree with it, they 
effectively repeal it without satisfying the constitutional requirements of bicameralism 
and presentment.  And in fact they undercharge frequently, especially when the 
legislature has set a mandatory minimum for the highest defense supported by the facts.74  
This undercharging subverts the legislature’s textually-expressed desire to ensure greater 
uniformity and punitiveness for these offenses. 
At the prudential level, prosecutorial discretion seems particularly troublesome.  
In contrast to the rule-of-law values animating textualist approaches to judicial discretion, 
the current regime of prosecutorial discretion—to which they acquiesce—looks a lot like 
                                                 
73 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 70 at 1178 (“[T]he trouble with 
the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it does not satisfy this 
sense of justice [equality before the law] very well.  When a case is accorded a different 
disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the system of justice is to be respected, 
not only that the later case be different, but that it be seen to be so.”). 
74 See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME & 
JUST. 131, 177-78 (2005). 
 rule-by-men.75  Part II.A demonstrated that, outside of the exceptional example of the 
United States Attorneys, prosecutors can use an amalgam of strategic, ethical, policy-
based, or even political and personal considerations (including “moral outrage”76) when 
choosing whether to enforce the law at all, let alone interpret it any particular way. 
Indeed, interdisciplinary research into prosecutorial behavior reveals of great 
diversity of influences on prosecutorial decision-making.  Prosecutors, for example, may 
follow unconscious heuristics that result in unequal treatment.77  Psychological literature 
suggests that prosecutors, like police investigators, are vulnerable to: confirmation or 
expectancy bias;78 coherence bias;79 attribution bias, including gender80 and race81 
                                                 
75 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL 
THEORY OF LAW 199 (1997) (suggesting that indeterminacy of rules leads to reliance on 
person values in judicial decisions). 
76 Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of 
Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WILLIAM AND MARY L. REV. 251 (1993). 
77 Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: 
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 119, 130 
(1994) (explaining that that one cannot eliminate an unwanted mental process unless they 
are aware of it); Chris Guthrie, et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 
820 (2001) (applying concept to judges specifically); Dan Simon, A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 36-37 (1998) (“[Judges’] 
opinions do not include all the reasons which actually influenced the judge’s decision.  
Naturally, judges leave out reasons of which they are not consciously aware . . . .”). 
78 D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in 
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(2002); Keith A Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision 
in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 309-16 (2006).  This may be exacerbated by 
the fact that prosecutors offices are usually structured to respond to cases brought to 
them.  Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public 
Accountability: The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor 11 (Harvard Univ. 
Program in Criminal Justice Policy & Mgmt., Working Paper No. 00-02-04, 2000), 
available at http:// 
www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/community_prosecution.pdf. 
79 Keith A Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 317-23 (2006) 
 attributions; and commitment bias.82  Further, prosecutors may commit to prosecuting a 
case on account of non-legal institutional pressures, including: public83 and political 
pressure84 for guilty verdicts pleas;85 the exigencies of the adversarial trial system;86 high 
                                                                                                                                                 
80 See, e.g., Jennice Vilhauer, Essay, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in the 
Prosecution of Domestic Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 956-60 (2000); Alexi 
Nicole Vital, Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the Violence Against Women Act: An 
Analytical Comparison, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 171, 183 (2000). 
81 Lynn Hecht Schafran & Norma J. Wilker, Gender Fairness in the Courts: Action in the 
New Millennium 31 (State Justice Institute 2001) (“What judges can and must do is 
recognize [suspect] elements in their own thinking and consciously try to counter their 
influence by rendering fair and impartial decisions.”). 
82 See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 113 
(1975) (arguing that a prosecutor, because he believes it is morally wrong to prosecute an 
innocent person, may personally convince himself of guilt); C. RONALD HUFF, ARYE 
RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 111 (1996); cf. Amanda T. Snellinger, Commitment as an Analytic: 
Reflections on Nepali Student Activists’ Protracted Struggle, 29 POLAR POL. & LEGAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 351, 354 (2006) (“Hardship reconfirms the nature of selflessness 
and devotion to the country that people exercise through political struggle.”). 
83 JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE 47 (1977) (“Individual 
prosecutors’ effective performance is generally measured by the number of trials (with 
violent crimes most highly valued), the percentage of convictions (including pleas), and 
the length of sentence for repeat and violent offenders.”); William F. McDonald, Plea 
Bargaining: Critical Issues and Common Practice 10 (Dept. of Justice, 1985); Catherine 
M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public Accountability: The 
Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor (Harvard Univ. Program in Criminal 
Justice Policy & Mgmt., Working Paper No. 00-02-04, 2000), available at http:// 
www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/community_prosecution.pdf. 
84 Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-
Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2006). 
85 Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal 
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90 (2005); F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, 
Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense 
Counsel, and the Judge, 16 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 189, 211 (2002). 
86 See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 99, 
114 (1975); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
95, 142-51 (1996); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in 
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585 (2005); Daniel Givelber, The Adversary 
System and Historical Accuracy: Can We Do Better?, in WRONGLY CONVICTED 253, 
 caseloads;87 and the agenda-setting effects of most prosecutor offices’ reactive case 
intake structures.88  Further, heuristics may also reinforce each other—as illustrated in 
many of the Innocence Project cases.  An attribution bias, for example may lead 
investigators to look for a suspect of a particular race, a commitment bias may cause 
prosecutors to stick to an indictment even in the face of considerable counterevidence, 
and courts’ hindsight biases may prevent a retrial and successful appeal.89 
Finally, at the practical level, unrestrained prosecutorial discretion could reduce 
the perceived legitimacy of prosecutors’ decisions.  Plea bargains are particularly 
problematic because (the defendant’s entry of the plea aside) prosecutors neither create a 
                                                                                                                                                 
253-54 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001); Bruce A. Green, Why 
Should Prosecutors ‘Seek Justice’?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 609 (1999). 
87 Ample research has been conducted regarding time and caseload pressures that police 
officers face, and how that may foster bias.  See, e.g., JOHN E. ECK, MANAGING CASE 
ASSIGNMENTS: THE BURGLARY INVESTIGATION DECISION MODEL REPLICATION 71-72 
(1979); Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful 
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1159 (2005); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
FAIRNESS & EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 227-28 (2004).  This principle 
may similarly apply to perpetually busy prosecutors. 
88 Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 
553 (1997) (“Not surprisingly, the picture presented to the prosecutor almost always 
shows a guilty defendant.”).  This may be exacerbated by prosecutors’ reactive case 
intake structures.  See also Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem 
Solving, and Public Accountability: The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor 11 
(Harvard Univ. Program in Criminal Justice Policy & Mgmt., Working Paper No. 00-02-
04, 2000), available at http:// 
www.ksg.harvard.edu/criminaljustice/publications/community_prosecution.pdf. 
89 See Keith A Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 295-300 (2006) (relating the Innocence Project 
case of Marvin Anderson, where precisely this happened). 
 record establishing the factual basis for a conviction, nor survive the crucible of a trial—
both which foster accountability and legitimacy in the adjudicatory process.90 
In any case, “the law,” in any objective sense, seems almost secondary to the 
pressures and preferences of the individual prosecutor.  Under textualists’ approach to 
statutory interpretation, the legislature cannot create rule-by-men through 
unconstitutional delegations to executives and legislative committees, and judges cannot 
impose their personal preferences when applying statutes.  Executives, including 
prosecutors, apparently are given free reign to apply the law according to personalized, ex 
post principles. 
B. Consistent, Principled Decision-making 
1. Formalists Believe that Uniform and Equal Application is Essential to the Rule of 
Law 
Not only should the law be autonomous, formalists argue: it should also be 
consistent, applied equally to every similar situation.  They have therefore traditionally 
criticized judicial methodologies that afforded judges wide discretion to consider the 
facts of a case.91  These criticisms in part relate to the belief that, to have the rule of law, 
all people should be treated equally and fairly.   
This is not to say, however, that modern-day formalists think that decision makers 
can totally strip policy judgments from their thinking.  Instead, in cases were authorities 
                                                 
90 See John Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 UNIV. CHICAGO LAW REV. 3 
(1978). 
91 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 70 at 1178 (“[T]he trouble with 
the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it does not satisfy this 
sense of justice [equality before the law] very well.  When a case is accorded a different 
disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the system of justice is to be respected, 
not only that the later case be different, but that it be seen to be so.”); see also id. at 1179-
80. 
 are forced to make a substantive choice in applying the law, formalists recommend that 
they choose a consistent normative framework to ensure uniform, fair application.92 
For example, in a biting dissent to Silveira v. Lockyer, where the Ninth Circuit 
denied an individual-rights-based Second Amendment claim, Judge Alex Kozinsky 
acknowledged that in areas where there is little constitutional guidance that judges 
must—rather than mechanically apply the law—make value-laden choices.93  
Nonetheless, he argued, courts must impose consistent rules on themselves: “If we adopt 
a jurisprudence sympathetic to individual rights, we must give broad compass to all 
constitutional provisions that protect individuals from tyranny.”94   
                                                 
92 See Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying rehearing to decision 
denying individual-rights-based Second Amendment claim). 
93 See id. at 568-70 (emphasis added). 
94 Id. at 569 (emphasis added).  Judge Kozinsky warns that, beyond endangering 
individual rights, the selective enforcement of a particular constitutional philosophy 
undermines the legitimacy of the judiciary: 
Judges know very well how to read the Constitution broadly when they are 
sympathetic to the right being asserted. . . . When a particular right 
comports especially well with our notions of good social policy, we build 
magnificent legal edifices on elliptical constitutional phrases--or even the 
white spaces between lines of constitutional text. . . . [But] when we’re 
none too keen on a particular constitutional guarantee, we can be equally 
ingenious in burying language that is incontrovertibly there. 
It is wrong to use some constitutional provisions as springboards for major 
social change while treating others like senile relatives to be cooped up in 
a nursing home until they quit annoying us. As guardians of the 
Constitution, we must be consistent in interpreting its provisions. If we 
adopt a jurisprudence sympathetic to individual rights, we must give broad 
compass to all constitutional provisions that protect individuals from 
tyranny. If we take a more statist approach, we must give all such 
provisions narrow scope. Expanding some to gargantuan proportions 
while discarding others like a crumpled gum wrapper is not faithfully 
applying the Constitution; it’s using our power as federal judges to 
constitutionalize our personal preferences. 
 Similarly, Professor Daniel Farber convincingly observes that Justice Scalia 
likewise will eschew the textualist methodology where a particular area law is firmly 
rooted in judge-made law.95  This, Professor Farber claims, shows that Scalia is a 
formalist before he is a textualist—after all, formalists value uniformity and predictability 
above all else.  In cases where discretion must be exercised, then, formalists believe 
decision-makers should systematically constrain their discretion to further the uniformity 
and impartiality of the law.96 
2. Broad Prosecutorial Discretion Invites the Use of Inconsistent, Non-Statutory 
Considerations in the Administration of the Law 
To the extent one believes formalism prevents adjudicators from “finding their 
friends in the crowd,” they are comforted that judicial participants can receive fair, equal 
treatment.  If a prosecutor is bound by something similar to the Ashcroft Memo, they are 
forced to treat each case according to the ex ante rules set by Congress, much as a 
textualist believes she is bound by the objective meaning the arises from the legislative 
deal.  Their only role, theoretically, is to evaluate the facts of the case and see where they 
fit under the rules. 
To the extent prosecutors make the sundry extra-statutory considerations 
described in Part II.A (trial strategy, conviction rate, political pressure, disagreement with 
mandatory minimums, etc.) however, they depart from the statutorily-supplied neutral 
                                                                                                                                                 
Id. at 568-69 (emphasis added). 
95 See Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 101 
(1995) (in cases where there is a non-textualist jurisprudence in place, Justice Scalia will 
follow that instead of being textualist.  This, Farber argues, shows Scalia values 
consistency over the particular methodology of textualism). 
96 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 70 at 1179-80. 
 principles.  Individual prosecutors surely strive to achieve justice in each individual case, 
whether to ensure they get some conviction rather than none, or if they give a defendant 
what they believe is a well-deserved second chance.  At a meta-level, however, the ability 
to treat seemingly-like cases differently may diminish judicial participants’ perceptions of 
the evenhandedness of the judicial process. 
 C. Predictability and Reliability 
1. Formalists Believe Uniformity and Predictability are Essential to the Rule of Law 
Formalists desire uniformity for more than its own sake.  The creation of readily-
applicable laws also benefits citizens and authorities by promoting predictability and 
reducing the burdens of on-the-spot decision-making on executives and courts.97  
Textualists particularly emphasize predictability’s importance, arguing that a formalist 
mode helps the legislature, judiciary, and citizens predict results and plan accordingly. 
From the legislative perspective, Justice Scalia has argued that “[w]hat is of 
paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear 
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of language it adopts.”98  The legislature 
arguably benefits from textualist methods because the textualist’s interpretive toolkit is 
relatively limited.99  This contrasts with intent-based and eclectic statutory interpretation.   
From the judicial perspective, textualists use legal realism and public choice 
theory to illustrate why intent-based legislative history causes unacceptably-unpredictable 
judicial administration.  Since individual legislators are motivated by different things 
when voting,100 they argue, queries into individual legislative intent are at best a fiction.  
                                                 
97 Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, supra note 12 at 636. 
98 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.). 
99 Doubtless, this effort to help the legislature is hurt by Congressional expectations that 
courts review legislative history.  See, e.g., Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: 
Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585 (1994) (arguing that textualism 
damages congressional authority and hinders essential requisites to the legislative 
process).  This debate, however, is beyond the scope of this Essay, which explicitly takes 
an internalist approach to textualism. 
100 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (discussing 
how unlikely it would be for hundreds of legislators to possess the same intent when 
voting in favor of legislation).  Professor Radin was a realist, not a formalist.  But 
textualists have taken his argument as their own.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, 
 Each legislator could innocently express their intent, but misrepresent the deal reached by 
the body. 
Other innocent errors can arise because of the increasingly-complex institutional 
realities of modern legislatures.  For example, statutory language often results from 
logrolling that is not part of the legislative record.  Trying to divine the relationship of 
one statutory provision to the rest of the deal embodied in an omnibus bill, for example, 
would face almost insurmountable difficulty.  Equally innocuously, legislative history 
materials may reflect the understanding of the staff that prepared them rather than their 
legislative principals.101 
But sometimes, textualists note, expressions of “legislative intent” are not so 
innocent.  Sometimes, textualists charge, expressions of legislative intent by committee 
members, bill sponsors, and those who enter statements into the record are outright 
manipulations.102    Legislators can plant evidence of contrary “intent” for intentionalists 
                                                                                                                                                 
History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 
(1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective body.”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983). (“Because 
legislatures comprise many members, they do not have “intents”‘ or “designs,”‘ hidden 
yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body as a whole, 
however, has only outcomes.”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989) ( “[T]he quest for the ‘genuine’ 
legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase.”). 
101 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(charging that committee reports are often drafted by staff members at their own initiative 
or at suggestion of lawyer-lobbyist); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (“[L]egislative history is a poor guide to legislators’ intent because it is 
written by the staff rather than members of Congress . . . .”). 
102 Just as formalists have drawn from realism, see Radin, supra note 100, they have used 
public choice theory.  They claim that the ordering of choices, for example, prevents 
clear expressions of legislative intent.  See Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 
74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988); Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 100 at 547-48.  
This, of course, comes from “Arrow’s theorem.”  See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL 
 to find later.  The legislative “statements” of Senators Lindsey Graham and John Kyl 
during the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act103 exemplify this concern.  After the 
act passed, Senators Graham and Kyl inserted an extensive “colloquy” into the 
Congressional Record.104  In this colloquy—which was never uttered on the floor—the 
senators claimed that Congress knew the act would remove the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction to hear pending Guantanamo detainees’ cases.  They then filed an amicus 
                                                                                                                                                 
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed., 1963); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-39 (1991). 
103 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.L. 109-241, Title II, § 218(a), 120 Stat. 526, 
codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801.  See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2766 n. 10 
(2006).  The significance of using or not using legislative history goes even deeper in 
Hamdan.  The majority finds import in Senator Levin, a cosponsor’s, statements to others 
that the Act wouldn’t strip the Court of jurisdiction on pending cases.  See id.  Justice 
Scalia, using only the language of the statute, finds that the language, ““[N]o court, 
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear” a detainee case “is simply not ambiguous 
as between pending and future cases.”  Id. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 119 
Stat. 2742, section 1005(e)(1).). 
104 Emily Bazelon explains: 
The problem is that Kyl and Graham’s colloquy didn’t actually happen on 
Dec. 21. It was inserted into the Congressional Record just before the law 
passed, which means that the colloquy did not alert other members of 
Congress to the views it contains. Inserting comments into the Record is 
standard practice in Congress. What’s utterly nonstandard is implying to 
the Supreme Court that testimony was live when it wasn’t. The colloquy is 
evidence of what Kyl and Graham thought about the meaning of the DTA. 
But it doesn’t show that any other member of Congress shared their 
understanding. Everything else in the record that directly addresses 
whether the DTA forces the Supreme Court to toss Hamdan comes from 
Levin or another Democrat—and explicitly states that the DTA leaves 
Hamdan alone. 
Emily Bazelon, Invisible Men, SLATE MAGAZINE, http://www.slate.com/id/2138750 
(March 27, 2006). 
 brief with the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, arguing that their statements 
represented Congress’s intent.105 
Texualists also draw on public choice criticisms to show how unreliable queries 
into legislative intent can be.  Using Arrow’s Theorem, Judge Easterbrook explains how 
subjective legislative intent is impossible to discern: 
Every system of voting has flaws. The one used by legislatures is 
particularly dependent on the order in which decisions are made. 
Legislatures customarily consider proposals one at a time and then vote 
them up or down. This method disregards third or fourth options and the 
intensity with which legislators prefer one option over another. Additional 
options can be considered only in sequence, and this makes the order of 
decision vital. It is fairly easy to show that someone with control of the 
agenda can manipulate the choice so that the legislature adopts proposals 
that only a minority support. The existence of agenda control makes it 
impossible for a court-even one that knows each legislator’s complete 
table of preferences-to say what the whole body would have done with a 
proposal it did not consider in fact.106 
In sum, textualists believe that sources of legislative history are legion and unreliable.  
“[L]egislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory [and its 
interpretation] . . . has a tendency to become, to borrow Judge Leventhal’s memorable 
phrase, an exercise in ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”107 
                                                 
105 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Appellate Brief, Brief of Senators Graham and Kyl as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 16 (February 23, 2006), available at 2006 WL 
467689 (citing 151 Cong. Rec. S14,260-S14,268) (“[T]he legislative history of Section 
1005 confirms that congress intended all of Section 1005 to be immediately effective, 
governing pending cases and any newly filed lawsuits alike.  The . . . colloquy between 
Senators Graham and Kyl—two of the primary sponsors of the amendment—makes that 
unmistakably clear.”) 
106 Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 100 at 547-48 (internal references 
omitted). 
107 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) 
(Kennedy, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some 
 By comparison, with the relatively spare interpretive tools—statutory language, 
statutory structure, linguistic canons, and similar use of terms in other statutes—
legislators arguably are better able to predict how textualists will implement the statutes.  
Legislators, then, do not have to police each other’s statements through the long and 
winding road between a bill’s introduction and signature by the President. 
Limiting permissible sources of legislative meaning arguably benefits normal 
citizens, too. 108  Innumerable attorney hours spent on legislative history would be saved.  
And the law—even if still complex—would become a bit more understandable to 
laypeople. 
2. Prosecutorial Discretion May Encourage Unpredictable Results between 
Different Jurisdictions and Individual Cases 
One of the reasons Justice Scalia worries about judicial discretion is that it will 
lead to non-uniformity across the United States’ many federal jurisdictions.109  Multiply 
this concern by the thousands for prosecutors’ offices.  Professor Wright and Engen’s 
study of charging discretion in North Carolina demonstrates that, even within a particular 
jurisdiction, prosecutorial discretion results in non-uniform charging.  Instead, “the 
evidence clearly shows that offenders who are charged with similar crimes--especially 
the most serious crimes--often receive very different punishments.”110 
                                                                                                                                                 
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 
68 IOWA L.REV. 195, 214 (1983)). 
108 See Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, supra note 12 at 650 
(footnote omitted). 
109 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 70 at 1178-79. 
110 Wright & Engen, Effects of Depth and Distance,  supra note 28 at 1978; see also 
Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent 
 At a minimum, Wright and Engen’s study in North Carolina and Professor 
Fraser’s study in Minnesota show that legislators are not necessarily getting the results 
they predicted.  Prosecutors seemed particularly disposed to reducing charges to avoid 
mandatory minimum laws and stiffened criminal sexual conduct law111—both of which 
of reflect the legislature’s textually-expressed desire to ensure greater uniformity and 
punitiveness regarding these offenses.  Likewise, criminal defendants and their counsel 
face higher bargaining costs and uncertainty. 
In fact, prosecutorial discretion likely imposes greater information costs than 
judicial discretion.  Courts at least generate readily-reviewable orders and opinions; these 
explain courts’ decision-making processes and can be criticized and invalidated if unfair 
or unlawful.  In contrast, a charging decision or plea-bargaining decision does not 
necessarily generate any record, other than an unexplained act of filing or entering the 
agreement. 
And as a practical matter, courts are disinclined to review prosecutors’ charging 
and plea-bargaining decisions.112  Without meaningful review, the same prosecutor might 
impose different criteria to similar situations with little consequence, and different 
prosecutors could impose different criteria with no consequences.  Legislatures 
attempting to make the law, and parties attempting to follow it, may not reliably predict 
                                                                                                                                                 
Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 550-51 
(1978). 
111 See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME & 
JUST. 131, 177-78 (2005). 
112 Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining, supra note 51 at 717. 
 what the law practically is, because prosecutorial discretion replaces rule-of-law with 
rule-by-prosecutors.113 
D. The Role of the Legislature: Political Responsiveness under Bicameralism and 
Presentment Requirements and the Non-delegation Doctrine 
1. The Formalist Conception of the Legislative Role 
Transparency achieves advantages beyond citizen understanding.  Textualists 
claim that their interpretive approach ensures that courts serve as faithful agents of the 
legislature, and that the legislature is politically accountable for its decisions.  Courts thus 
become both the legislature’s faithful agents—and in a roundabout way—their 
taskmasters.  Both roles, formalists claim, inhere to the American system of government. 
a. Enforcing “the Deal” 
Formalists believe that the legislature is the primary and only constitutionally-
legitimate lawmaker in our system of government.114  If it is the legislature’s job to create 
                                                 
Wright & Engen, Effects of Depth and Distance,  supra note 28 at 1937. 
114 Aside, of course, from the interstitial lawmaking inherent to judicial application and 
legislatively-authorized administrative rulemaking.  See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (conceding that “a certain degree of 
discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive and judicial action, and it is 
up to Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to 
determine--up to a point--how small or how large that degree shall be.”); NBD Bank, 
N.A. v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (acknowledging that 
“[n]o Member of Congress can anticipate all questions that will come to light; and a body 
containing hundreds of members with divergent agendas can't answer even a small 
portion of the questions that do occur to its members.”). 
 law, it is the judiciary’s role to faithfully apply it.115  Otherwise, the judiciary has denied 
citizens their right to republican representation.116 
The court’s role, then, is to enforce “the deal,” whatever it is.  The “deal” resulted 
from a democratic process: give and take, extensive debate, heated opposition.117  It may 
not live up to the stated ideals of the sponsors, but then again, that compromise was likely 
necessary to assuage others’ concerns.118  The deal may not match up with any individual 
legislator’s intent, or the sponsors’ for the matter.119  It may even contradict itself at 
times.120  In the end, “deal” is represented by the statute’s text.121 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 
221 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“our duty is to construe rather than rewrite 
legislation”). 
116 Although Professor Muriel Spence interestingly argues that textualism robs the 
legislature of its prerogatives.  He claims that Congress expects courts to use legislative 
history, and that refusing to consult it thus diminishes congressional authority.  
Moreover, he argues, discounting legislative history may discourage the legislature to 
engage in the fact-finding that’s requisite to modern legislation.  See Muriel Morisey 
Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585 
(1994).  While there may be merit to Prof. Spence’s argument, it does little to diminish 
the theoretical values underlying textualism—which I submit are fundamentally opposed 
to the currently broad discretion afforded executives. 
117 Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 100 at 540-45 (characterizing statute as a 
“deal”). 
118 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America, 443 U.S. at 221-54 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that amendment to Title VII was to alleviate concern of mandated 
racial preferences to detriment of whites—even though this didn’t achieve the highest 
possible ideals of the legislation’s sponsors). 
119 See, e.g., Livingston Rebuild Ctr., Inc. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 970 F.2d 295, 298 
(7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Congress does not enact ‘intents’, and certainly not the 
intents of witnesses; it enacts texts, which may differ from the expectations of the 
sponsors.”). 
120 West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (arguing that 
imaginative reconstruction “profoundly mistakes our role . . .  [which is] to make sense 
rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.  But where, as here, the meaning of the term 
prevents such accommodation, it is not our function to eliminate clearly expressed 
 If the text represents the only legitimate deal to which the legislature assented, 
imaginative reconstruction of it “profoundly mistakes [the judicial] role . . . .”122  
Imaginative interpretation, aside from being vulnerable to the interpretive pitfalls 
described above, is essentially anti-legislative, as it disrupts the delicate compromise 
embodied in the legislative text. 
b. Holding the Legislature to “the Deal” 
Textualists do not enforce the legislative deal as an act of kindness.  Instead, they 
do it to hold the legislature politically accountable for its deal: if they struck it, they are 
stuck with it.  If legislators can avoid the political consequences of their deals, they 
become unaccountable to their constituents. 
                                                                                                                                                 
inconsistency of policy, and to treat alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen 
to treat differently.”). 
121 See Livingston Rebuild Ctr., 970 F.2d  at 298 (Easterbrook, J.).  Justice Scalia 
forwards a structural constitutional argument to make the same point—that “intents” are 
not subjected to the procedural obstacle course that a bill’s text must survive to become 
law: 
No one would think that the House of Representatives could operate in 
such fashion that only the broad outlines of bills would be adopted by vote 
of the full House, leaving minor details to be written, adopted, and voted 
upon, only by the cognizant committees. Thus, if legislation consists of 
forming an ‘intent’ rather than adopting a text (a proposition with which I 
do not agree), Congress cannot leave the formation of that intent to a small 
band of its number, but must, as the Constitution says, form an intent of 
the Congress. 
Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S.Ct. 637, 645 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  For more discussion of 
the bicameralism and presentment argument, see Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1980) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring). 
122 See West Virginia Univ. Hosp., 499 U.S. at 100 (Scalia, J.). 
 Intentional vagueness allows legislators to escape accountability on two levels.  
During the enactment process, most legislators are not forced to defend their decisions.  
Instead, they leave the statute’s terms vague, and the sponsors strategically sprinkle 
legislative history and take the heat.  After enactment, most legislators enjoy the best of 
both worlds: If the law proves popular when enforced, they can say that their intent was 
properly discerned; but if the same law proves unpopular, they can say that the courts 
misunderstood their intent.123 
Professor John Manning gives this claim a constitutional basis in the article, 
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine.124  Professor Manning argues that political 
accountability is written deeply into our constitutional system.  Congress enters a deal, 
                                                 
123 One can see this play out in the legislative response to TVA v. Hill, which held that the 
Endangered Species Act’s plain terms required the Tennessee Valley Authority to halt the 
construction of a dam that endangered a local fish.  See Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).  Congress immediately established an administrative 
mechanism for granting exemptions to Act, and it specifically exempted the dam halted 
by TVA.  See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 
GEO. L.J. 281, 294 (1989) (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (amended 1979)).  Justice 
Powell, who dissented in TVA, may have smartly replied that they understood Congress’s 
intent when it passed the original ESA, but that perhaps misses the point.  See id. at 209-
10 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 348-49 (1986).  
But perhaps judicial faithfulness differs from judicial slavishness: one implies an equal 
relationship where the judiciary requires the legislature to fulfill its constitutional roles, 
whereas the other covers for and perhaps enables legislative abdication of its 
constitutional responsibilities.  Under this latter view, Justice Burger’s TVA majority 
forced Congress to express its intent in a politically-accountable way.  Development and 
environmental protection were locked in zero-sum competition.  The TVA majority forced 
Congress to take from one and give to the other.  It forced Congress to admit that the 
ESA’s lofty rhetoric was sometimes exactly that—rhetoric.  See also Farber, Statutory 
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, supra note 123 at 298 (“Judges must not allow 
legislators to use statutes to strike poses, knowing that courts will bail them out later. Not 
only does the supremacy principle act as a constraint on courts, it also, indirectly, 
disciplines the legislature.”). 
124 John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 
(1997). 
 but its “say” is complete once the deal becomes law.  The executive should faithfully 
enforce the law, and courts should interpret and apply it. 
At this point, Congress cannot interfere with the law’s application, short of 
amending it.  If those applying the law are faithful, the public can readily see what 
Congress has done, and then hold it accountable.  Intentionally-vague legislation, 
however, delegates decision-making and accountability to committees and sponsors.  
This, Manning argues, is an abdication—an unconstitutional delegation—of legislative 
power and accountability.125 
                                                 
125  According to Manning, Congress now expects courts to resolve ambiguities using 
legislative history: 
That basic understanding of interpretive reality, which textualists 
ultimately share, leaves ample room for the claim that courts rely on 
legislative history not because it reflects actual intent, but because 
legislators now expect their ambiguities to be resolved according to its 
lights.  If that is the case, then one might argue that Congress implicitly 
delegates law elaboration authority to committees and sponsors, when it 
enacts an ambiguous statute accompanied by a committee’s or sponsor’s 
explanation of its meaning. 
Id. at 673.  This “out” perversely encourages legislators to punt on controversial 
issues while still maintaining control over a law’s implementation: 
[T]he exercise of law elaboration authority by constitutionally independent 
actors supplies Congress with a crucial structural incentive to resolve 
important issues in the enacted text.  To the extent that Congress enacts a 
vague or ambiguous statute that leaves an important policy question 
unanswered, the separation of powers ensures that the question will be 
answered for Congress by an entity beyond its immediate supervision.  If, 
however, Congress can effectively delegate law elaboration authority to its 
own committees or members, that structural incentive is substantially 
undermined; issues left unresolved by a duly enacted statute will be 
clarified in accordance with the views of actors firmly under 
congressional control, operating outside the constraints of bicameralism 
and presentment. 
Id. at 706-07 (emphasis added). 
 Whether one subscribes to the bicameralism and presentment criticism of as 
Justice Scalia does, or a separation of powers critique of Professor Manning, textualism 
enforces the formal separation of powers in the Constitution.  This separation ensures 
legislative accountability and protects the procedural crucible necessary to protect the 
citizenry from rule-by-faction.  And, as a final analytic step, protection from rule-by-
faction inheres to the formalist conception of the rule of law. 
2. Wide Prosecutorial Discretion Breaks the Legislative Deal and Encourages 
Statutory Vagueness 
The legislature is the first among three equal branches.  Courts, formalists argue, 
must enforce the deals reach by the legislature to prevent legislative disempowerment and 
abdication.126  It is not immediately clear why the executive should take a different tack 
than courts in enforcing legislative deals. 
On one hand, prosecutorial discretion threatens to deny citizens the policies that 
they supported.  If the people vote for legislators who want harsh mandatory minimums, 
then they should get them.  On the other hand, the legislature must be held accountable 
for its decisions.  It is hardly healthy for our political system if legislators can reap the 
political benefits of tough-on-crime rhetoric, and then not have to pay the price—
escalating corrections and judicial costs.  Yet this is exactly what is happening, for 
example, in North Carolina and Minnesota, where prosecutors use charge reduction to 
dull the impact of mandatory minimum laws.127 
                                                 
126 See supra Part II.D. 
127 See Wright & Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance, supra note 28 at 1957-58 
(discussing how, in North Carolina, prosecutors particularly dull the impact of criminal 
offense statutes that require prison time); Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 
 E. The Role of the Legislature’s Agents 
1. Formalists’ Conception of the Legislative Role 
The flip side of legislative non-delegation is the prevention of judicial legislation.  
Although both are typically couched in terms of separation of powers, they center on the 
fundamentally different natures of the institutions: the legislature is politically 
accountable by design but is tempted insulate to itself; the judiciary is politically-
insulated by design, and is tempted to think of itself as politically accountable.  For the 
former, the danger is abdication of legislative authority; for the latter, it is seizure of 
legislative authority.  Just as textualists claim their interpretive methodologies ensure that 
legislatures legislate, they ensure that courts adjudicate rather than legislate.128 
Doubtless centralization of power was one of the Founders’ animating concerns.  
The Federalist Papers outline how the separation of powers into the functions of 
enactment, enforcement, and interpretation protected liberty.129  While the Federalists 
claimed the judiciary was the most harmless of branches, formalists argue it is more 
dangerous in practice.  Through lifetime tenure, the judiciary is insulated from political 
pressure. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1978-2003, supra note __ at 177-78 (showing that, in Minnesota, prosecutors reduced 
charges especially in child sex abuse cases).   
128 For a classic discussion of the “counter-majoritarian difficulty,” see ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
16-23 (1962). 
129 FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Hamilton or Madison). 
 Under principles of separation of powers, one branch cannot exercise its powers 
such that it usurps those of another.130  To allow otherwise would undermine a system 
designed to use one branch’s ambition to check that of the others.131  Under our system of 
government, courts’ power is to “declare the sense of the law”; if they go farther by 
“exercis[ing their] WILL instead of JUDGMENT,” they overturn the legislative power.132   
Judicial usurpation need not happen outright: if a court uses interpretive methods 
so elastic that they are effectively legislation, it has appropriated the legislative 
function.133  Textualists attempt to avoid the temptation of legislation through self-
                                                 
130 William N. Eskridge, J.r, Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 
1529 (1998) (book review of ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).). 
131  
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several 
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer 
each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives 
to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in 
this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. 
FEDERALIST 51 (Hamilton or Madison). 
132 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Madison).  Professor Eskridge rather persuasively argues 
that it was the losers in the constitutional debate—the anti-Federalists--who were 
concerned with freewheeling judicial interpretation of statutes, rendering formalists’ 
reliance on the Federalist Papers a bit ironic.  See Eskridge, Textualism, the Unknown 
Ideal?, supra note 130 at 1530-31 (citing FEDERAL FARMER XV, N.Y.J., Jan. 18, 1788, 
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST at 315-16).  Nonetheless, as a matter of 
political philosophy, contemporary formalists’ approach arguably best serves the 
concerns outlined by Madison in Federalist 78. 
133 Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-472 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Federalist No. 78 in his criticism of the liberal use of the "absurd 
results" rule).  See also Eskridge, Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, supra note 130 at 
1529; Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 70 at 1184-85. 
 imposed constraints: “a solid textual anchor or an established social norm from which to 
derive the general rule . . . .” 134   
All of this again ties into rule-of-law values.  The limitation of the judicial 
function to interpretation is necessary to prevent rule-by-men—in this case, an insulated 
judicial elite. 
2. Similarities in the Executive Role  
Doubtlessly prosecutor discretion does not implicate the same concerns regarding 
judicial usurpation of the legislative function.  As already discussed in this Part, however, 
prosecutors can usurp the legislative function by under-enforcing (or even not enforcing) 
particular laws.  While the ability to under-enforce is a “negative power,” it is 
nonetheless profound: a prosecutor assumes the legislative power of repeal when he 
chooses to not charge where the facts support it. 
Some argue that it is the job of the judiciary and the prosecutor to ensure that 
justice is done in each case.  Sometimes the legislature sets inflexible or arbitrary rules.  
For example, Professor Kevin Saunders has illustrated how the courts’ duty to be the 
legislature’s faithful agent can be at odds with doing justice.135  The inflexible mandatory 
minimum sentences under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, he observes, compelled 
federal judges to stringent sentences arbitrarily: 
[I]f one defendant is convicted of possession of 4.99 grams of crack 
cocaine and another is convicted of possession of 5.01 grams of crack 
cocaine, the two would seem equally culpable. Under the minimum 
sentencing requirements, however, the first would face a maximum 
                                                 
134 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 70 at 1184-85. 
135 See Kevin W. Saunders, A Symposium on Film and the Law, Billy Budd and the 
Federal Sentencing Mandates, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 211 (1997). 
 sentence of one year, while the second would face a mandatory minimum 
of five years. 
Id. at 218. In response to these kinds of arbitrary results, some judges threatened 
to resign or used procedural rules to reach the just result.  Professor Saunders submits that 
system that overly constrains judicial discretion, like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
is unjust because it ignores all of the case’s elements.  In cases like the one described 
above, the guidelines failed to consider any other aspect of the defendant, such as that he 
might be a first-time offender, or had highly or less culpable motivations when 
committing the crime.  In others, they create arbitrary distinctions that treat like cases 
differently, as when the Guidelines mandatory minimum sentences jumped by several 
years when was convicted of possessing just more or less than 5.0 grams of rock 
cocaine.136 
Observations like these seem to support the argument that it is part of the 
executive and judiciary’s roles to exercise discretion, and that overzealous efforts to 
dampen this role will cause injustice.  This argument is convincing—as far as it goes.   
Recalling Professor Sunstein’s admonition, however, we do not face a binary 
choice between unconstrained discretion and no discretion.137    We need not, like 
Congress, attempt to strip context out of the system.  We can, instead, attempt to design 
institutions and substantive law to at least modestly observe and regulate the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.  I in fact offer a range of proposals in Part VI that would temper 
prosecutorial discretion without squeezing contextual decision-making out of our legal 
system. 
                                                 
136 Id. 
137 See Sunstein, supra note 12 at 640. 
 Moreover, if judges or prosecutors choose to nullify, on a case-by-case basis, laws 
that they perceive to be unjust, they may be failing the broader system of government 
even if they achieve better results in an individual case.  While one prosecutor may 
choose to not charge a particular offense, another in a different jurisdiction will.  Now, 
like defendants are being treated differently for no good reason—exactly the injustice 
identified above.138  At least if an unfair law was prosecuted frequently, there would be a 
chance that it would cause a public outcry and legislative change.139 
F. Institutional Independence 
1. Clear Ex Ante Rules Help Courts Make Consistent, Albeit Unpopular Decisions in 
“Tough Cases” 
Institutional independence is the final corollary value animating textualism.  
Equitable statutory interpretation is tempting.  Sometimes, it is unpopular to hold the 
legislature to “the deal,” and in other cases to find its acts unconstitutional.  If a decision-
maker caves and use their “exercise [their] WILL instead of JUDGMENT,” they replace 
the rule of law with rule-by-men.140  It is much easier to take an unpopular stand, 
                                                 
138 See supra Parts III.B.-C (emphasizing how overly wide prosecutorial discretion may 
damage equality before the law). 
139 See supra Part III.D (explaining how overly wide prosecutorial discretion may 
damage the legislature’s role by confounding majority preferences and eliminating 
democratic accountability). 
140 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Madison).  Professor Eskridge persuasively argues that it 
was the losers in the constitutional debate—the anti-Federalists—who were concerned 
with freewheeling judicial interpretation of statutes, rendering formalists’ reliance on the 
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130 at 1530-31 (citing FEDERAL FARMER XV, N.Y.J., Jan. 18, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE 
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philosophy, contemporary formalists’ approach arguably best serves the concerns 
outlined by Madison in Federalist 78. 
 however, if it comports with a long-established, discretion-constraining principle.141  
Formalism offers these discretion-constraining—and surprisingly empowering—
principles: originalism in constitutional adjudication; textualism in statutory 
interpretation; and bright line rules and stare decisis in the common law. 
2. Clear Ex Ante Rules May Help Prosecutors Make Consistent, Albeit Unpopular 
Decisions in “Tough Cases” 
Just as with courts, it would be easier for a prosecutor to make an unpopular 
stand, if it comports with a long-established, discretion-constraining principle.142  
Prosecutors, who are political appointees or elected officials, arguably would be subject 
to more public pressure than courts.  As with courts, prosecutors may find discretion-
constraining, formalist rules surprisingly empowering in the face of public pressure. 
IV. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IS AN INADEQUATE COUNTERBALANCE TO DANGERS 
Only one argument can mitigate the concerns outlined in Part IV.  Executives, this 
argument goes, are publicly accountable for what they do.143  Administrative agencies, 
for example, often participate in the legislative process and are subjected to legislative 
oversight.  Prosecutors are either appointed by the executive (as with Assistant United 
States Attorneys) or are publicly-elected themselves, as is common at the state level.   
                                                 
141 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 70 at 1180 (“The changes that 
frail men and women will stand up to their unpleasant duty [of being just to an unpopular 
party] are greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid shield of a firm, clear 
principle enunciated in earlier cases.”). 
142 Id. (“The changes that frail men and women will stand up to their unpleasant duty [of 
being just to an unpopular party] are greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid 
shield of a firm, clear principle enunciated in earlier cases.”). 
143 See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 574-76 (1985) (arguing that administrative agencies are closer to the 
legislature and therefore more likely to successfully implement the legislative “deal”). 
 If executives are publicly-accountable, they are more likely to be faithful agents 
of the legislature.  If they subvert the legislative will, after all, they face unpleasant 
appointment, budget, and oversight meetings (in the case of administrative agencies) and 
public pressure and election challenges (in the case of prosecutors). 
Election or appointment does not necessarily translate into accountability for 
one’s discrete decisions for three reasons.  First, prosecutors make countless decisions, 
few of which receive the public’s attention.144  Prosecutors rarely lose reelection.145  
Second, prosecutors make decisions daily that are likely outcome-determinative for 
defendants, yet face no meaningful judicial review.146 
                                                 
144 Brian Forst, The Prosecutor and the Public, in THE SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 291, 294 (Brian Forst, ed. 1993). 
Professor George Christie illustrates this principle with the more-familiar example of 
legislative political accountability: 
Sometimes, however, the people to whom a decisionmaker is accountable 
are unable to exercise very much ongoing supervision of the 
decisionmaker’s performance. A legislator, for example, is accountable to 
his constituents. But these constitutents [sic] form an amorphous group, 
able to exercise their right to discipline their legislative representatives 
only at discrete intervals that may be separated by substantial periods of 
time. Under these conditions, the constituents can neither specify an 
exclusive, all-encompassing set of criteria for the legislator to consider in 
making choices nor enforce conformity to these criteria on a day-to-day 
basis. They must inevitably be prepared to accept relatively untrammeled 
decisionmaking from their legislative representative. 
George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 754-755 (1986). 
145 Cassidy, Character and Context, supra note 26 at 657; Ross, The Entrenched Position 
of Plea Bargaining, supra note 51 at 717. 
146 While discretion that simply causes variable results, i.e., “primary discretion,” Stuart 
S. Nagel, Discretion in the Criminal Justice System: Analyzing, Channeling, Reducing, 
and Controlling It, 31 EMORY L. J. 603, 604-05 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and 
Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 359, 363, 378 (1975), is problematic in itself, see supra Part I.A, prosecutorial 
discretion is especially problematic, the most significant forms of prosecutorial discretion 
 Third, even if a prosecutor is politically accountable, accountability may have 
discomfiting results.  The public may reward a good “batting average” more than faithful 
implementation of legislative mandates.  Or it may call for prosecution where it is 
warranted (as in the Duke Lacrosse case)—or exoneration where the law calls for 
conviction. 
V. POSSIBLE REMEDIES 
Under a formalist evaluative lens, unrestricted prosecutorial discretion may 
threaten the health of American government.  Other commentators have identified some 
of these problems in isolation, but have not situated them within an overarching 
theoretical critique.  But what solution can there be?  After all, each case is different: 
different defendants, different victims, different lawyers, and different evidence.  Perhaps 
this is why most solutions involve selecting prosecutors of “better character.”147 
Professor Christie explains that our tendency to constrain discretion increases in 
proportion to our pre-existing ability to constrain it.  Thus while, today, mainstream 
opinion may be that it is too difficult to review prosecutorial decision, the creation of 
institutions to conduct such review may bootstrap a different attitude into existence.148  
                                                                                                                                                 
(particularly charging and plea-bargaining) are of particular because they constitute 
“secondary discretion,” i.e. they are insulated from further review.  Maurice Rosenberg, 
Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 
(1971); Keith A Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision 
in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 351-52 (2006) (“most [nondisclosure] 
violations are never detected because, by definition, the defense does not know about 
them; violations can be litigated only if the defense learns of the nondisclosed 
information through some fortuity that usually occurs sometime after trial.”).  
147 Cassidy, Character and Context, supra note 26 at 639-41. 
148 George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 756-757 (1986) 
(“The more capable we feel of closely supervising people ostensibly accountable to us, 
 Additionally, as Professor Sunstein observed, formalism is not an all-or-nothing 
proposition.149  Rather, the question is one of how much formalism is desirable to solve a 
particular problem.  In this final Part, I tentatively describe possible formalist solutions to 
the problem of prosecutorial discretion. 
A. Curbed Discretionary Mechanisms 
The simplest, if most drastic, solution, is to strip prosecutors of discretion in 
particular contexts.  The most extreme version of this would be a mandatory charging 
rule, where prosecutors were required to file the highest possible charges for which they 
believed there was probable cause.150  This proposal’s flaws are quickly apparent.  On 
one hand, a mandatory charging rule would swamp prosecutors’ offices.151  On the other, 
it would still leave prosecutors wriggle room to reduce charges based on their assessment 
                                                                                                                                                 
the more likely we are to try to exercise that supervision by curtailing the range of 
choices available to those people.”). 
149 See Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, supra note 12 at 640. 
150 Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining, supra note 51 at717. 
151 Absent a radical reconsideration of the prosecutor’s role, the judicial resource 
argument is overwhelming.  One possible alternative, however, would be to return to 
older models of prosecution, which did not necessarily involve prosecutor’s offices: 
In the last century prosecutors were used to write indictments and to try 
felony cases (or dismiss or plead them).  The justice process was largely 
controlled by the police and the judiciary.  Prosecutors were absent from 
the lower courts, often referred to as ‘police courts,’ where the police 
served as prosecutors.  If the cases were screened out of the system at all, 
it was done by the judicial officer at either the initial appearance or the 
preliminary hearing (or by prosecutors nol-prossing (dismissing) cases 
after they were indicted).  These arrangements still exist in many 
jurisdictions or have only recently been changed. . . . 
William F. McDonald, Plea Bargaining: Critical Issues and Common Practice 10 
(Department of Justice, 1985). 
 of a case’s facts.  A softer version of this proposal would be to establish relatively 
rigorous charging policies like those followed by Assistant United States Attorneys.152 
B. Increased Judicial Review 
While it may seem counterintuitive to a textualist, increased judicial discretion 
may in fact strengthen our government’s checks and balances.  Judicial review could 
assume many guises, from trial courts’ intensified review of plea bargaining to appellate 
courts’ use of harmless error and prejudice rules when considering criminal appeals.153  
Further, increasing trial judges’ sentencing discretion may check prosecutorial over-
charging and over-reaching during plea negotiations.154 
C. Extralegal Restraints 
Various extra-legal programs could increase prosecutors’ political accountability.  
First, legislatures could collect charging, plea, and conviction data to legislature.  This 
will assist the legislature in determining whether prosecutors are being its “faithful 
agents.”  Second, prosecutor’s offices can impose guidelines on themselves, as the U.S. 
Attorney’s office has done.155  Third, prosecutor’s offices can create internal separations 
of powers, splitting quasi-judicial functions (investigation, case evaluation, and plea 
                                                 
152 See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (describing the Department of Justice’s 
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153 Keith A Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 355 (2006). 
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155 Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe: Practical Methods 
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 bargaining) and adversarial functions (litigation) to ensure that “the pressures of the 
adversarial process do not corrupt the independence of a prosecutor’s judgment.”156 
D. Substantive Criminal Penalty Reform 
Finally, the North Carolina and Minnesota research discussed throughout this 
Essay illustrates the profound effect that substantive criminal penalty law has on 
prosecutorial behavior.  If prosecutors have many charging options for a particular fact 
pattern, which Wright and Engen call “depth,” they are far more likely to engage in plea 
or charge bargaining, which in turn risks contravention of legislative intent.  
Additionally, if prosecutors are forced to choose between relatively different punitive 
options—for example, between only crime with a community-based correctional option 
and one with mandatory prison time—they are less likely to engage in plea bargaining.  
To the extent one believes that prosecutors’ plea and charge bargaining risks derogation 
from “the deal,” they may wish to decrease the “depth” and increase the “distance” in the 
penalties for similar conduct.157  
CONCLUSION 
Hopefully this Essay has delivered on its promise.   While many have misgivings 
about the wide discretion currently held by executives, especially criminal prosecutors, 
formalism and textualism offer a conceptual lens through which to understand this 
discretion’s effects on the rule of law.  After brief examination, prosecutors’ charging and 
                                                 
156 See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a 
Passionate Pursuit, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1695, 1716 (2000). 
157 Wright & Engen, supra note 28 at 1973. 
 plea negotiation powers raise particular concerns, namely that prosecutors can distort the 
legislative “deal” and thereby replace the rule of law with rule by men. 
On a theoretical level, formalists and textualists face a dilemma: can they support 
broad executive discretion while advocating the limitation of judicial discretion?  This 
Essay suggests that no, this cannot be done without compromising the fundamental 
political critique upon which textualism is based.  Instead, a consistent formalist critique 
suggests that, like the judiciary, the executive must impose restraints on itself so that the 
legislature has the power to effectively enact the people’s will into law—and be held 
accountable for its decisions.  I have tentatively outlined a menu of reforms that may 
restore the executive’s rightful place in our tripartite system of government. 
